Information security
National Nuclear Security Administration needs to improve contingency planning for its classified supercomputing operations : report to congressional requesters
by United States. Government Accountability...
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Over the past several years, federal agencies have rapidly adopted the use of wireless technologies for their information systems. In a 2005 report, GAO recommended that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in its role overseeing governmentwide information security, take several steps to help agencies better secure their wireless networks. GAO was asked to update its prior report by (1) identifying leading practices and state-of-the-art technologies for deploying and monitoring secure wireless networks and (2) assessing agency efforts to secure wireless networks, including their vulnerability to attack. To do so, GAO reviewed publications, guidance, and other documentation and interviewed subject matter experts in wireless security. GAO also analyzed policies and plans and interviewed agency officials on wireless security at 24 major federal agencies and conducted additional detailed testing at these 5 agencies: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration. GAO is making two recommendations to OMB to enhance governmentwide oversight and four recommendations to the Department of Commerce for additional guidelines related to wireless security.
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Title from cover screen (GAO, viewed on Dec. 15, 2010).
"December 2010."
In the absence of underground nuclear weapons testing, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) relies on its supercomputing operations at its three weapons laboratories to simulate the effects of changes to current weapons systems, calculate the confidence of future untested systems, and ensure military requirements are met. GAO was requested to assess the extent to which (1) NNSA has implemented contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing for its classified supercomputing systems, (2) the laboratories are able to share supercomputing capacity for recovery operations, and (3) NNSA tracks the costs for contingency and disaster recovery planning for supercomputing assets. To do this work, GAO examined contingency and disaster recovery planning policies and activities, and analyzed classified supercomputing capabilities at the weapons laboratories, and NNSA budgetary data. GAO recommends, among other things, that NNSA clearly define roles and responsibilities for its component organizations in providing oversight for contingency and disaster recovery planning for the classified supercomputing environment. NNSA agreed with most of GAO's recommendations, but did not concur with recommendations relating to capacity planning and cost tracking.
"GAO-11-67."
Includes bibliographical references.
System requirements: Adobe Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.538
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